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This paper builds on a circular road model of the world with horizontal product 
differentiation and free entry and exit of firms, to derive results that can be applied in 
industrial organization, international trade and political economy.  The model shows 
that freer international trade increases welfare -with ideal variety preferences- 
through the exploitation of economies of scale and better allocative efficiency; that 
all participating countries gain from trade, and that smaller countries have more to 
win from free trade than larger countries.  The model also explains that there may be 
adjustment costs when liberalizing trade and thus, political resistance to trade 
liberalization. International migration can also be analyzed with the model, showing 
the possibility of suboptimal migration flows and political barriers to the exit of 
national citizens.  The model suggests that foreign direct investment will be welfare 
improving for the source country in the short run, and for the receiving country in the 
long run.  Finally, the model provides a microfoundation for the use of demand 
curves with constant and negative slopes. 
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COMERCIO, MIGRACIÓN E INVERSIÓN INTERNACIONAL CON 
DIFERENCIACIÓN HORIZONTAL DE PRODUCTO Y LIBRE 







Este documento se basa en un modelo de carretera circular del mundo con 
diferenciación horizontal de producto y libre entrada y salida de firmas, para derivar 
resultados que pueden ser aplicados en la organización industrial, el comercio 
internacional y la economía política.  El modelo muestra que un comercio 
internacional más libre aumenta el bienestar –con preferencias de variedad ideal- 
por medio de la explotación de economías de escala y de una mejor asignación de 
recursos, que todos los países participantes ganan con el comercio, y que los 
países más pequeños tienen más que ganar del libre comercio que los países 
grandes.  El modelo también explica que puede haber costos de ajuste al liberar el 
comercio y que por lo tanto, puede haber resistencia política a la liberación del 
comercio.  La migración internacional también puede ser analizada con el modelo, 
identificando la posibilidad de que haya flujos subóptimos de migración y barreras 
de política a la salida de ciudadanos nacionales de un país.  El modelo sugiere que 
la inversión extranjera directa mejorará el bienestar del país fuente en el corto 
plazo, y el bienestar del país receptor en el largo plazo.  Finalmente, el modelo 
provee una microfundamentación para el uso de curvas de demanda con 
pendientes constantes y negativas. 
 
Palabras clave: Competencia monopolística, diferenciación horizontal de producto, 
comercio internacional, migración internacional e inversión extranjera directa. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper builds on the circular road model of horizontal product differentiation of Eaton 
et al. (1975) with free entry and exit of firms, to derive results that can be applied in 
industrial organization, international trade and political economy. 
 
The model shows that freer international trade increases welfare -with ideal variety 
preferences- through the exploitation of economies of scale and improved allocative 
efficiency; that all participating countries gain from trade, and that smaller countries have 
more to win from free trade than larger countries.  Furthermore, the model explains that 
there may be adjustment costs when liberalizing trade and thus, political resistance to 
trade liberalization.  International migration can also be analyzed with the model, showing 
the possibility of suboptimal migration flows and political barriers to the exit of national 
citizens.  The model suggests that foreign direct investment will be welfare improving for 
the source country in the short run, and for the receiving country in the long run. 
 
II. PREVIOUS  LITERATURE 
 
Many of the insights generated in this paper have been derived before in a monopolistic 
competition model within a general equilibrium setting, by Lancaster (1979) –with ideal 
variety preferences- and by Krugman (1979) –with love of variety preferences-.  In fact, the 
model presented in this paper can be interpreted –at least in part- as a formal and partial 
equilibrium representation of the model presented in an intuitive manner by Lancaster 
(1979).  A similar approach but with some differences in the parameters used and 
emphasising the effects of tariffs was followed by Schmitt (1990).  Other authors that have 
made written in this area include Salop (1979), Schmitt (1995), and Boccard and Wauthy 
(2000). 
 
The main contributions of this paper are that the results generated here are derived within 
a partial equilibrium framework, highlighting the different effects of trade in goods between 
larger and smaller countries; giving a more careful look at the political economy of trade 
and migration; and providing insights into the potential benefits of foreign direct   4
investment.  The paper also provides a microfoundation to the use of demand curves with 
constant and negative slopes. 
 
II THE  MODEL 
 
A.  Assumptions and notation 
 
The basic assumptions of the model presented in this paper are: 
 
i.  The world can be represented as a circular road of extension equal to α, where 
all countries are located one on top of the other (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 
A CIRCULAR ROAD WORLD 
 
 
ii.  There is one industry (this is a partial equilibrium model). 
iii.  The good produced is homogeneous. 
βB 
βA
βRest of the world 
Location of firms in country B 
Location of firms in country A   5
iv.  There are N producers of the homogeneous good, that represent N varieties of 
that good in terms of location. 
v.  Firms play a two stage game:  on the first stage, they determine locations, and 
on the second stage they determine their prices. 
vi.  To solve the model by backward induction, in the second stage of the game 
firms are assumed to be located at a distance 
N
α
 of each other. 
vii.  The sales of the representative producer are noted by x. 
viii.  Each firm has the same cost structure  ex f TC + = , where f is the fixed cost 
and e is the constant marginal cost. 
ix.  Consumers are homogeneous and uniformly distributed along the circular road 
(there are β consumers on every unit of distance of the road, with β > 0). 
x.  Consumers have identical ideal variety preferences and they all consume one 
unit of the good, as long as the utility they receive from that consumption is 
non-negative.  Thus, the representative consumer will have the following utility 
function: 
 
td p u U




u* =  Utility derived from consuming one unit of the good. 
P = Unit price of the good. 
t =  Unit transport cost for the consumers, with t > 0. 
d = Distance to the nearest producer. 
xi.  There are no international transport costs. 
 
B. Autarky  Equilibrium 
 
In this paper, a symmetrical equilibrium is searched.  Thus, the second stage of the game 
identifies what is a symmetric Nash Equilibrium in prices.  Then, by backward induction, 
the first stage of the game identifies a Nash Equilibrium in locations.  The paper also   6
identifies what is the number of producers, what are their sales, and what is the level of 
welfare per capita at equilibrium. 
 
To do so, the model works with the long run monopolistic competition conditions as 
follows: first, the sales of a typical firm in a circular road model are derived.  Then, the 
optimal strategy price and the corresponding quantities are obtained from the profit 
maximization condition.  These price and quantities -and the locations initially assumed-, 
are shown to be not only optimal strategies for the firm, but also a Nash Equilibrium for the 
market.  The next step is to find the endogenous number of firms (varieties) from the cero 
profit conditions.  Finally, the autarky equilibrium is completed by expressing the utility 
function of the average consumer in terms of the parameters of the model, and analysing 
the impacts that changes in the parameters of the model have on key variables. 
 
1.  Deriving the sales of a typical firm in a circular road model. 
 















The vertical bases of the umbrellas show the location of each producer, and the extension 
of the vertical bases represent the prices charged by the producers located at each base.  
[(α/N)-d]  d
p p  
p  7
The slope of the arms of the umbrella is the uniform unit transport cost of the consumers.  
Given that the total cost incurred by a consumer located at a given point over the circular 
road -when buying a unit of the good- is the price paid plus the unit transport cost 
multiplied by the distance travelled, the heights of the arms of Hotelling’s umbrellas show 
the total cost for a given consumer of buying the good from the producer located at the 
base corresponding to each umbrella. 
 
The equation that describes the marginal consumer, i.e., the consumer that is indifferent 
between buying to the producer located nearest to the right hand side, and the producer 
located nearest to the left hand side is: 
 
  ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − + = + d
N
α
t p td p 
 















Given that the model is symmetric, and in particular, given that the per unit transport costs 
are uniform, the sales of the producer that is nearest to the right of the marginal consumer 
in figure 1 are: 
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2.  Profit maximization condition 
   8
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In a symmetric equilibrium, if all other firms charge the same price, the optimal strategy 













p + =           ( 4 )  
 
Repeating this process for all other firms, and assuming a symmetric equilibrium in which 
all other firms charge the same price  p, a Nash Equilibrium in prices will occur when all 
firms charge a price equal to the one shown in (4). 
 





x =          ( 5 )  
                                                           









x − ⎥ ⎦
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⎢ ⎣
⎡ + =    9
Note that in the circular road model, if all firms charge identical prices, locating at a 
distance  N
α
 will be a Nash Equilibrium in location.  Thus, a Nash Equilibrium has been 
found for location in the first stage, and for prices in the second stage. 
 
3.  The cero profit condition 
 
Free entry and exit of firms ensures that in the long run, firms will have cero profits.  The 
cero profit condition of profit maximizing firms is met when the average costs equal the per 

















Thus, the total number of firms (varieties) expressed in terms of the parameters of the 





α N =           ( 6 )  
 
Replacing (6) in (4), the equilibrium price can also be expressed in terms of the 






          ( 7 )  
 
Since the price includes a mark-up over marginal cost, resources are not allocated 
efficiently.  The lower the fixed and transport costs, and the higher the market density, the 
better the allocative efficiency and the lower the price.  Falls in the marginal cost will also 
lower the equilibrium price.  10
 





x =           ( 8 )  
 
This means that higher population density and fixed costs, and lower unit transport costs, 
will lead to higher equilibrium quantities.  Note also that in the symmetric equilibrium and 
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which is a demand curve with a constant and negative slope.  In this sense, the model 
developed in this paper provides a microfoundation to the use of this simple type of 
demand curves. 
 







d =           ( 9 )  
 
As such, the utility function of the marginal consumer in terms of the parameters of the 


















* − − =
β
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Now, in the symmetric Nash Equilibrium in prices, the utility of the consumer located 
exactly in the same place where a producer is located is u*-p.  This means that there will  11
be transactions in this economy only as long as u* ≥  e
β
ft
+ .  On the other hand, the 
utility of the marginal consumer is given by (10).  This implies that all consumers will buy 
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Besides, the utility of the average consumer will be given by: 
 
2
td p u p u
U








* − − =          ( 1 1 )  
 
Thus, a nation’s welfare per capita in autarky will increase (decrease) the lower (greater) 
the fixed, marginal and transport costs, and the greater (lower) the population density. 
 
Note that the number of varieties is endogenous, and since individuals have ideal variety 
preferences, it does not have an ultimate impact on welfare.  Note also that the size of the 
circular road (α) has a direct effect on the number of firms, but it does not have an impact 
on the level of production per firm and the level of equilibrium prices and so, it does not 
affect the level of welfare. 
 
C. International  Trade. 
 
International trade can be introduced in this model as an increase in population density 
perceived by the producers of the good3.  To do so, assume that there are two countries 
as follows. 
 
 Country    Population  density 
 A      βA 
                                                           
3   The size of the circular road (α) is kept constant and equal in all countries since as mentioned above, it 
affects the number of producers but it does not affect output per firm, prices and welfare.  12
 B      βB 
 
The cicular road world with free trade between A and B will look as in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 




To start with, note that if both countries are identical, their autarky equilibrium conditions 
will also be identical.  However, if one country is smaller than the other, the larger country 
will have in autarky more varieties, lower prices, higher output of each variety produced 
and greater welfare per capita, than the smaller country. 
 
Note also that with free trade and no international transport costs between A and B, the 
change in population density perceived in A and B will lead to a new equilibrium that can 
be expressed as: 
 
βA+βB
βRest of the world 
Location of varieties in A 









































− =         ( 1 5 )  
 
This means that in both A and B, and regardless of weather A and B are large and/or 
small, the number of varieties available will increase, the per unit prices will fall, output of 
each variety will increase and welfare per capita will be higher.  This gains from trade will 
be generated by the better exploitation of economies of scale (output per firm will be 
higher) and the improved allocative efficiency (the mark-up of prices over marginal costs 
will be lower) thanks to the free entry and exit of firms (lower unit costs of production and 
cero profits at equilibrium). 
 
Furthermore, the free trade varieties, prices, output per variety and welfare per citizen will 
all be identical in both countries, regardless of their original size.  As such, the gains from 
free trade will be larger for smaller countries, than for larger countries. 
 
It has been shown that 
A FT N N >  and that 
B FT N N >  and under this conditions, the pattern 
of trade will be intra-industry –local varieties are exported and foreign varieties of the same 
good are imported-. 
 
D.  Political Economy of Trade Policy 
 

















The sum of the varieties available in autarky in country A, plus the number of varieties 



























NA + NB will be higher than NFT if: 
 
( ) () B A B A β β β β + > +  
 
That is, if 
 
  0 β β 2 B A >  
 




FT B A N N N > +  
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The number of varieties available with free trade is less than the sum of varieties available 
in A and in B in autarky.  This means that since the remaining firms produce more, and the 
total density of the countries and the consumption per capita do not change, some firms 
have to exit the market. 
 
Although the number of firms is endogenous in this model, and has no direct impact on 
welfare, this result is important for political economy reasons.  In particular, there will be 
resistance to trade liberalization, because some firms will disappear -and some factors will 
have to move from some firms to other firms- introducing adjustment costs.  However, 
such resistance may be milder with intra-industry trade than with inter-industry trade, since 
factors are moving within the same sector, as is the case in this paper.  Besides, in the 
long run resources will remain fully employed with free trade, just as they were in autarky. 
 
E. International  Migration. 
 
International migration can be introduced in this model as a shift in population density 
between countries.  With no trade in goods and services and ceteris paribus, if countries A 
and B free up population movements, the following effects will occur: 
 
i.  As pointed out earlier, if one country has a higher population than the other, its 












Thus, if population movements are allowed ceteris paribus, all the people will move from 








A CIRCULAR ROAD WORLD WITH FREE MOVEMENTS OF POPULATION BETWEEN 
A AND B, WHERE βA > βB 
 
 
ii.  If A and B are identical, there will be no movements, since per capita welfare will be 
identical.  However, this equilibrium will be unstable, since all that is required is that 
one consumer moves from one country to the other (to make welfare in the 
receiving country higher than in the country of origin), for all his fellow countrymen 
to do the same, just as in the previous case. 
iii.  If one country has a technological advantage (lower f, e and or t), and both 
countries are identical in all other respects, the technologically advanced country 









5 B A >  
 
and all consumers will go from the less technologically advanced country (A) to the 
more technologically advanced country (B). 
βA
βOther countries  17
iv.  If one country has a technological advantage (lower f, e and or t), but at the same 
time that country is smaller than the other country, it is possible that the size 
advantage may more than compensate the technological advantage in terms of 


























In this case, all consumers will go from the more technologically advanced country 
(B) to the less technologically advanced country (A), and the final equilibrium will 
be pareto dominated, i.e., there will be suboptimal migration flows.  All the 
consumers in the world would have been better off if they had managed to live in 
the technologically advanced country. 
 
F.  Political Economy of International Migration 
 
In this model, if international migration occurs at all, it will lead to emptying one country.  
Although this is an unlikely outcome, in this case such movements could lead political 
leaders –and even some economists- of the country whose consumers are leaving to put 
barriers to the exit (rather than barriers to entry) in order to avoid the massive departures 
of its citizens.  To understand why, assume that A has a higher autarky welfare than B, 
and that all consumers in B want to migrate to A.  If consumers in B go to A, all consumers 
in B will have higher welfare than before (the gross national income will be higher in both 
countries A and B).  But the citizens located in B (none), will have cero welfare (the gross 
domestic product in B will be cero and lower than in autarky).  Think of a dramatic but not 
complete migratory movement.  Then, the citizens that for whatever reason remain in 
country B will be worse off than in autarky (again, B will have a lower gross domestic 
product). 
 
This could explain -at least in part- although it may not justify, the exit restrictions that have 
prevailed in certain countries, or those that prevailed in former communist countries, given 
the welfare incentives for consumers and policy makers.  18
 
G  Foreign Direct Investment 
 
In this model, with identical cost structures, without international trade and ceteris paribus, 
if firms have identical technologies, there will be no incentives for foreign direct investment 
(FDI) flows, regardless of the size of the countries.  However, if firms in country B have a 
technological advantage over firms in country A, there would be an incentive for FDI flows 
to move from B to A since at the prices in A firms in B would be able to make a positive 
profit in the short run.  However, if there is free entry and exit of foreign investors, 
eventually the firms in B investing in A would have cero economic profits in the long run.  
On the other hand, the long run gains in welfare per capita in A from receiving the FDI 























This paper has built on the circular road model of horizontal product differentiation.  The 
model derived shows that in autarky, larger countries have higher welfare than smaller 
countries.  The model also shows that freer international trade increases welfare -with 
ideal variety preferences- through the exploitation of economies of scale and through 
better allocative efficiency, that benefit consumers thanks to the free entry and exit of 
firms. 
 
In autarky, larger countries will have higher welfare than smaller countries, and although 
all countries that take part in international trade, gain from trade, with free trade all of the 
world’s countries have the same welfare per capita, regardless of their population size.  
This implies that smaller countries have more to win from free trade than larger countries.  
As is usual in the literature of trade with imperfect competition, the pattern of trade in this 
model is intra-industry. 
  19
Furthermore, the model explains that there may be adjustment costs when liberalizing 
trade because some producers will exit the market and some factors will have to move 
from some firms to other firms.  These adjustment costs are likely to generate political 
resistance to trade liberalization, although such resistance may be milder with intra-
industry trade than with inter-industry trade, since factors are moving within the same 
sector.  Besides, in the long run, all resources will be fully employed with free trade, as 
they were in the autarky equilibrium. 
 
Allowing for international migration within the model has highlighted the possibility of both 
suboptimal migration flows, and the existence of political barriers to the exit of national 
citizens.  Besides, foreign direct investment would provide short run gains for the source 
country and long run gains for the receiving country.  As a by product, this paper has 
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